How to Say Things with Formalisms by Auerbach, David
4HOW TO SAY THINGS
WITH FORMALISMS
David Auerbach
SUMMARY
Recent attention to "self-consistent" (Rosser-style) systems raises anew the
question of the proper interpretation of the GOdel Second Incompleteness
Theorem and its effect on Hilbert's Program. The traditional rendering and
consequence is defended with new arguments justifying the intensional
correctness of the derivability conditions.
I
The conception of formalism as uninterpreted, but interpretable,
systems that was wavering into focus during the 1920s achieved
clarity in Godel's 1931 paper. The historical irony here is that
while this clarity fulfilled one of Hilbert's demands for firm
foundations, the Godel results themselves have been seen as
frustrating Hilbert's central epistemological desire.
Due in part to Hilbert's vagueness in formulating his demands,
and in part to the subtlety of the issues involved, there remains an
ongoing debate as to whether the First Incompleteness Theorem
scuttled Hilbert's Program, whether only the Second did, or
whether neither did. Leaving detailed exegesis of Hilbert aside, I
propose to investigate some very general issues that arise in the
course of such debate.
Hilbert wanted to save mathematics from Kronecker's construc-
tivist critique, a critique made pointed by the antinomies of set
theory. Hilbert, however, shared some of Kronecker's basic
epistemological scruples and thus proposed, on one interpretation
of his project, to salvage the nonconstructivist part of mathematics
by making it meaningless but helpful.
This instrumentalist reading of Hilbert is arguable. Or rather,
"meaningless" might be taken only as Fregean meaningless. It is
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not that the nonfinitary mathematics is true because, inter alia, its
terms refer, but that its terms refer because it is true. The Hilbert
Program then aims at making sense of this notion of truth prior to
reference. This would make Hilbert what we would now call a
meaning-holist. For present purposes I need not choose between
these Hilberts; the common core is the claim that the theorems of
mathematics get all of their acceptability from system-wide con-
siderations and not from the one-by-one truth of the theorems or
axioms. His enduring insight was that the representation of
theories about infinitistic matters as finitistic objects (formalisms)
gave one a finitistic handle on the nonfinitistic. Here is the standard
story in brief.
Some parts of mathematics are about finite objects and finitisti-
cally establishable properties of them. The "upper bound" on this
conception of finitary mathematics is the notion of the "poten-
tially" infinite, as exemplified by the sequence of natural numbers.
(It is, of course, a matter of some dispute as to how to mark
precisely, in extension, this distinction.) This part of mathematics
the Hilbertian treats contentually: questions of truth and belief
arise and, roughly speaking, it has a Fregean semantics continuous
with that of nonmathematical concrete language.
The rest of mathematics consists of ideal pseudo-statements
whose only role is the efficient and secure calculation of contentual
statements. (The noninstrumentalist Hilbert would put this: the
rest of mathematics consists of ideal statements whose truth is
explicated by their role in the efficient and secure calculation of
contentual statements.) Hilbert wanted to assuage Kronecker's
epistemological doubts that rendered ideal sentences problematic.
But Hilbert thought that they possessed a significance insofar as
they were useful in deriving real statements. This usefulness arises
because a finitistic proof of a real sentence might be unfeasibly
long or difficult, whereas a proof that took a shortcut through the
infinite might be shorter or at least easier to find. I Along with this
explanation of the usefulness of the ideal, Hilbert needed a certifi-
cation of its safety: that is, that there is no ideal proof of a false
real proposition. This is real-soundness.
Hilbert saw the then nascent conception of formalism as vital at
this point. If ideal proofs could be finitistically represented as
manipulations of concrete symbols and strings of symbols, then a
real proof about ideal proofs becomes a feasible notion. Hilbert
also thought that the combinatorial properties of concrete symbols
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were the real content of arithmetic; in this way the entire actual
content of mathematics becomes metamathematical. All real
mathematics is about symbols (and finitary systems of symbols).
This answers Kronecker's complaint that the content of mathemat-
ics should be exhausted by the elementary theory of numbers.
The Hilbertian would like a finitistic proof of real-soundness;
however, real-soundness of T implies consistency of T and, if T
includes finitistic reasoning, T cannot prove T's consistency. So
finitistic proofs of real-soundness are a forlorn hope and the
epistemological goal of Hilbert's Program is unattainable. 2
There are two related matters in this brief story that I wish to
disinter. The first is the cavalier manner in which talk of math-
ematics is replaced by talk of formal theories - in which theorems
about formalisms are used to motivate conclusions about math-
ematics proper. The second is the very much related issue of the
sense in which consistency is expressed in a formalism. These are
not only hard to get straight, but positions on these matters are
often difficult to extricate from the viewpoint being argued. I will
be arguing that once these buried matters are exhumed and
examined, we will be able to safely rebury Hilbert's Program.
II
In an earlier paper,J I argued that there is a considerable distance
between the technical result about formalisms that Godel sketches
in Theorem XI and since known (in various generalized forms) as
the Godel Second Incompleteness Theorem and its standard gloss.
The standard gloss states that no sufficiently strong formal system
can prove its own consistency or (as above) T cannot prove T's
consistency, for Ts that extend PA. Note that the first theorem
makes no claim about the content of its underivable sentence.
What would smooth the path from the mathematical theorem to
the philosophical gloss are the Positive Expressibility Thesis (PET)
and the Negative Expressibility Thesis (NET):4
PET The underivable (in T) sentence of the Godel Second
Incompleteness Theorem does express consistency.
NET No derivable (in T) sentence expresses consistency.
Detlefsen (1986), in an intriguing resurrection of Hilbert's
Program, argues that NET has not been established. He exploits
the fact that special problems arise in looking for a satisfying
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account that would establish PET and NET. These problems, and
technical machinery for ameliorating them, have recently become
more widely known. I sketch them here, focusing on Peano arith-
metic and its formalization PA.
In proving the First Incompleteness Theorem a formal predicate
is constructed that numeralwise expresses is a derivation of, and
from this predicate is constructed the famous G6del sentence.
Letting Prf(x, y) be an arbitrary predicate that numeralwise
expresses is a derivation of, the G6del sentence is -,3xPrf(x, k),
where k is the Godel number of a formula provably (in PA) equiv-
alent to -,3xPrf(x, k). Many formulas numeralwise express is a
derivation of, and any of them will suffice for the First Theorem. If
we now construct -, 3xPrf(x, r .1 ') as a plausible candidate for a
consistency sentence, we get the problem that some such sentences
are trivial theorems. The classic example uses Rosser's derivability
predicateS but other constructions have been studied.
So either NET is false or we can find some reason to exclude
Rosser-type predicates. Now we can find some ways to exclude
them; but in the insightful and important Chapter IV of Detlefsen
(1986) it is argued that these ways are not reasons.
The way that Detlefsen considers descends from the Hilbert-
Bernays derivability conditions. In particular, the formalization of
what Detlefsen calls local provability completeness, LPC, plays the
crucial role. LPC is simply
LPC If f-TA, then f-TBewT([Aj),
and its formalization is"
F-LPC
F-LPC is, of course, familiar in modal guise, as it appears in modal
treatments of provability: f- DA -+ DDA. Detlefsen argues that
no argument for the necessity of F-LPC, as a condition on correct
derivability predicates, works.
It is instructive to look at an untenable attempt at establishing
NET, due to Mostowski, to see what can go wrong. Mostowski's
goal is to justify F-LPC by seeing it as part of the project of
representing as many truths about provability as possible.
Bew(x) is naturally viewed as the existential generalization of
Prf(x, y) where Prf represents the derivability relation. Here
"represents" has the purely technical meaning of "strongly rep-
resents" or "numeralwise expresses" - whenever a is a derivation
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of b, Prf( ra" r b,) is a theorem and whenever a is not a proof of b,
-,Prf( r a', r b,) is a theorem. This enforces the extensional
adequacy of the representation of is a derivation of, but does not
yield F-LPC.
But not all truths are particular, that is, numeralwise, truths. So
perhaps we should demand that all truths concerning provability
be represented. The first stumbling block is that Godel theorems
show the impossibility of this for precisely the case in point. So we
weaken the demand to one that as many truths as possible be
represented.
But for the latter proposal to make sense we have to construe it
as demanding that certain truths be represented. But which? An
answer that lists F-LPC is circular with respect to the project at
hand, which was justifying F-LPC. (Any variation on a purely
quantitative approach that subsumes F-LPC will run into the
following problem: we will not be able to codify any truth about
unprovability. Any assertion of unprovability is tantamount to
consistency.)
Detlefsen is certainly right about this strategy (as well as those
of Prawitz and Kreisel-Takeuti) of justifying the derivability con-
ditions. Those strategies, as Detlefsen demonstrates,7 attempt to
prove too much. We can do better by attempting less and relocat-
ing disputes about F-LPC to their proper philosophical arena. I
will return to this claim in Section V.
III
Under what conditions do we legitimately ascribe meaning to the
formulas of a formalization; and what do these conditions permit
by way of inference concerning the subject matter of the ascribed
meaning? To make this both concrete and simple: what justifies
the (correct) claim that in formalized Peano arithmetic we can
prove that 2 is less than 3 or that addition is commutative? In
much of what follows there is a tedious dwelling on standard tech-
nical moves that in technical contexts are treated off-handedly or
invisibly; here, for philosophical purposes, we linger over them.
What makes the formalism we call Peano arithmetic arithmetic
is more than the formalism; we do not need something as sophisti-
cated as the Skolem-LOwenheim theorem to tell us that un-
interpreted formalisms are uninterpreted.
Formal languages permit many interpretations, and except for
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perhaps in some contingent historical sense, no interpretation is
privileged other than by stipulation. Furthermore, for purposes
that exceed mere consideration of truth conditions in an exten-
sional language, the nonidentity of ways of giving the interpret-
ation is relevant. Note that this extends to the interpretation of
quantification, via the specification of the domain.H
We will want an account of "ways of giving" to extend naturally
to allow the usual overview of the First Theorem as proceeding by
constructing a formula that says that it is not derivable; and of the
Second Theorem as demonstrating the nonderivability of
consistency. (The First Theorem actually has very little to do with
interpretation. It is best seen as a remark about formalisms,
independent of their possible interpretations, and the machinery
necessary to prove it is indifferent to any rich sense of interpret-
ation. Thus Rosser's proof of the First Theorem does not proceed
"by constructing a formula that says it is not derivable." But this is
precisely the desirable expected result yielded by the intensional
account being developed.) To avoid using the awkward "ways of
giving" and the already otherwise employed "interpretation," I will
use "reading" to talk about the richer sense of interpreting for-
mulas sketched here.
The recasting of the language of formalized arithmetic so that
we can plausibly say that a certain sentence of arithmetic(!) says
that 3 is a quantifier, that G says that G is not provable, that COOT
says that T is consistent, is not accomplished directly, by parallel-
ing the arithmetic case.
As with arithmetic we start with the informal language, a piece
of technical but natural language, with which we theorize about the
syntax of formalisms. This language has terms for such entities as
If, 3, and predicates like is a formula, is a deri vation from, etc. The
objects that this language treats of include the symbols of PA and
pairs and sequences of them. Following Boolos, we call the
language the language of Syntax and the informal theory we couch
in it is Syntax.
We do not directly specify a reading of the language of PA in
terms of the language of Syntax. The syntactic reading of PAis,
unimportantly, parasitic on the arithmetic interpretation.9 We first
set up a correspondence between the objects of PA and the
objects of Syntax. This is Godel numbering. This is used to induce
a correspondence between the terms and formulas of PA and the
names and predicates of Syntax. The initial correspondence, at the
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level of the primitives of Syntax, is extension respecting - a term of
P A corresponds to a name in Syntax by denoting the GOdel
number of the object denoted by that name. Definitional
compounds in Syntax are then merely mimicked in P A. The initial
. coextensiveness guarantees the various useful meta-theorems
about this re-reading of P A: sentences of P A are derivable in P A
only if their counterparts are demonstrable in Syntax.
This correspondence makes no mention of the axiomatization of
P A; the same old extensional interpretation of P A now induces a
way of reading the formulas of P A as syntactic remarks. It is, of
course, a different collection of predicates of (conservative exten-
sions of) PA that will be of reading interest; typically, those whose
extensions are the usual syntactic categories and which have
"natural" readings into Syntax.
We abet and exploit the closeness of the correspondence by
using, for certain terms and formulas of P A, orthographic cousins
of their syntactic counterparts. II) A rather large amount of Syntax
can be mirrored in PA; crudely speaking, it is the Godel Second
Incompleteness Theorem that puts an upper bound on what can be
mirrored.
It may strike the reader that there is a freedom here that was not
present in the arithmetic interpretation of PA. Certainly, the strict
copying into the language of P A of definitions and proofs in
Syntax constrains the correspondence between P A and Syntax
more than mere co-extensiveness would. But no analogous stric-
tures were stated concerning the primitive correspondences from
which the whole is built up. But there are such strictures. The term
that corresponds to a name in Syntax is a numeral of P A. Without
such a stricture the Godel theorems would not be forthcoming and
certain quantificational facts about provability would not even be
statable.
Let Bew(x) be a formula of PA that results from a long series of
definitions in PA, as just outlined, such that we can read Bew(x) as
"x is derivable." We can read it like this because (i) in the standard
interpretation it is true of just the (GOdel numbers of) theorems;
and (ii) it was built up in P A by mimicking the standard definitions
of formula, axiom, variable, free for, etc. in Syntax. It is notable
that condition (i) can hold without condition (ii) and that some
formulas for which condition (i) but not condition (ii) hold are
sufficient for a proof of G 1 but not of G2. II
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IV
I have sketched an arithmetic reading of the language of P A and a
syntactic reading of the same language. Thus the very same
formula can be read in either way. While these readings concern,
so far, the language of PA, the justification of their strictures
develops from the use to which we put formalisms (Le. language
as well as axioms and a notion of derivation).
A use to which we put formalisms is the "capturing" of facts
about the intended reading. One aim is to characterize a syntactic
mechanism that isolates formulas whose readings are true. (This is
the successful component of Hilbert's Program.) We do this by
specifying the notion of a derivation. Furthermore, we often have
in mind the additional requirement that being a derivation reflect
the notion of proof in a straightforward way: readings of deri-
vations should be proofs. This is the epistemological applicability
requirement:
If A is informally provable from the principles that T
formalizes, then A is derivable in T; and derivations of
A in T formalize proofs of A.
Our account of "boldfacing," via structure-sensitive readings,
yields EAR, establishing PET and NET. The real work, in par-
ticular cases, is giving enough sense to the boldface mapping to
support EAR. Since is provable is an intensional predicate the
need for a structure-sensitive notion, sketched above as a
"reading," should be no surprise. 12
Built into our characterization of the reading of formulas of PA
as arithmetic and as syntactic was a respect for logical form. Thus,
if Fa is read as "14 is even," then 3xFx is read as "something is
even." When we add a notion of derivation to that language of PA
to get PA proper we also obtain a useful result: there will be a
derivation of 3xFx from Fa.
We need beware a potential confusion. In giving the syntactic
reading of the language of P A we did not use a notion of
derivation; derivation merely happened to be one of the notions of
the theory, Syntax, into which we were reading the formulas of
PA. Derivation makes a second appearance, which we are now
noting, as a part of PA, the neutral formalism. More precisely, we
now consider the full-fledged notion of is a derivation (of PA),
complete with specification of the usual axioms.
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The usefulness of our structure-sensitive readings exceeds the
modest consequence that theorems of PA tell us truths of Syntax;
the surplus value is that the derivations of PA correspond to
proofs in Syntax. So the appropriate start to a justification for the
usual gloss of the G6del Second Incompleteness Theorem amounts
to the observation that any purported proof of CON PA' using the
machinery formalized in P A, would give us a derivation of
CON PA' which is what the purely technical result tells us cannot
happen.
Here is the situation so far. Extension-respecting readings of
PA are inadequate even for explicating the representation of arith-
metic statements in P A. Structure-respecting readings reflect our
actual practice in reading formal formulas, and the somewhat
devious case of the syntactic reading of the formulas of P A was
partially detailed. When we add the usual axiomatization in P A we
get useful meta-theorems linking the derivability of certain
formulas in P A with the establishment of theorems of (informal)
Syntax. (Similarly, but less to the present point, we get useful
meta-theorems linking the derivability of certain formulas in PA
with the establishment of (informal) arithmetic.)
I now need to link the observations of Section II with those of
Section III. One fact Syntax can prove about Bew is that if
I-pAA then I-pAA Bew([A]). So PA, insofar as it is adequate to
Syntax, ought to be able to derive if I-pAA then I-pABew([A)). In
other words,
F-LPC I-pABew([A)) -+ Bew([Bew([A])])
where the notation used reflects the stipulations of note 11. And,
of course, F-LPC holds because the way we constructed Bew lJ
excludes Rosser-style predicates. Thus, this justification of F-LPC
does not depend on the Mostowski, Kreisel-Takeuti or Prawitz
arguments that Detlefsen rightly criticizes. However, in considering
arguments for F-LPC, and hence for NET, Detlefsen presents
positive arguments against F-LPC; it is to those that I turn in the
next section.
v
The notion of reading partially 14 developed above is the only
viable candidate I know that explains the uses to which we put
formalisms. As I read Detlefsen, his real quarrel is not with such a
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notion, nor even with constructions of Bew that guarantee F- LPC.
I think he thinks that even if EAR is true it has no deleterious
effect on the instrumentalist Hilbertian. For, quite simply, the
Hilbertian is not interested in the same notion of proof that we are.
Hilbertians should grant that F-LPC is an unarguable fact about
any Bew that really represents derivability - and further grant that
this notion of derivability nicely captures the classical notion of
proof. The Hilbertian's radical proposal is that our classical notion
of proof needs amendment and it is that amended notion that
belongs in the construction of a consistency sentence (cf. Detlefsen
1986: 121ff.). But this is prior to any formalization. The deriv-
ability conditions appear because Detlefsen finds inspiration for an
amended concept of proof in the Rosser predicates.
Detlefsen is careful to say that he is not, for various reasons,
proposing any particular Rosser-style concept of proof as a
candidate for Hilbertian proof. He does, however, regard them as
good models for the right sort of approach to proof on an instru-
mentalist basis; and he defends Rosser proofs against certain
objections (see Detlefsen 1986: 122ff.).
Nonetheless, I think the peculiar nature of such a notion of
proof is worth dwelling on, particularly since our rich notion of a
reading suggests a useful heuristic for thinking about derivability
predicates. .
Confronted with a derivability predicate that does not satisfy
F-LPC we have reason to be wary about statements made that
utilize it. Consider Edna, whose set of beliefs concerning formal-
isms is precisely characterized by our syntactic reading of PA.
Amongst her beliefs are beliefs about PA. When Edna says that if
A is derivable in PA then it is derivable in PA that that A is
derivable in PA, we have every reason to believe her. For, by our
stipulation about the nature of Edna's beliefs, this amounts to
F-LPC. If challenged, Edna can demonstrate F-LPC, having at her
command the power of induction and the inductive definitions of
Syntax.
Edna's situation differs from Ralph's. Ralph's set of beliefs is
also partly characterized by PA together with a deviant syntactic
reading: Ralph's beliefs about formalisms are characterized in
terms of some Rosser-style derivability predicate. That is, when
Ralph uses derivable in a belief we read it as a Rosser-style
predicate. Unlike Edna, Ralph believes that CON pA , although our
report of this would be less misleading if we said: Ralph believes
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that CON*PA' Note that CON PA and CON·PA are distinct, non-
equivalent sentences of PA. In fact, an even less misleading report
of Ralph's belief is:
Ralph believes that the largest consistent subsystem L' of PAis
consistent.
That PAis consistent and Ralph's belief that the largest consist-
ent subsystem of PAis consistent are radically different beliefs,
although PAis the largest consistent subsystem of PA. Leopold, a
skeptic about PA's consistency, would hardly be reassured by
Ralph's assertion of his belief, once he understood the content of
Ralph's belief. Nor, of course, can Edna reassure him since she
does not believe that PAis consistent. Of course, properly under-
stood, neither does Ralph. Neither Edna nor Ralph have the right
de re belief about PA necessary to assuage Leopold's worries.
We know that
1 Ralph can use his notion of derivability to prove anything Edna
can,and
2 Ralph knows that his notion of derivability will never produce a
proof of 1..
But Ralph does not know 1.
The recommendation that we reform our mathematical practice
and replace the canonical notion of derivability with a Rosser-style
one will indeed assure us, quite easily, of consistency. But that
epistemic gain is offset by the epistemic loss occasioned by not
knowing what it is that is consistent.
The epistemic trade-off is most easily seen by looking at
Feferman's version of a Rosser system. Taking some enumeration
of the (infinitely many) axioms of PA, we can define the notion of
an initial set of axioms. Then let R = {xix is a finite, initial, consist-
ent set of axioms} be Ralph's version of the axioms of PA. R is the
set of axioms of PA. Ralph's notion of derivation now has the
following character. 16
In reasoning about the formalism derived from R, Ralph
generates ordinary derivations, dl> d 2, d), .... If d/s last line is .1..,
he goes back and tosses out all derivations using axioms no smaller
than the largest one in d j • He proceeds, always tossing out such
derivations, and every time a derivation of .1.. is encountered the
toss-out procedure is repeated. An R-derivation is a derivation
that is never tossed out.
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Ralph can decide whether a given derivation is an R-derivation,
although neither he nor Edna can know that all derivations are R-
derivations. Leopold cannot rationally worry that R-derivation is
insecure. But he can, and will, be skeptical about the extent of
Ralph's knowledge.
The instrumentalist can reply that this is just fine; a secure
system of unknown extent is better than an insecure system of
known extent. Without direct quibbling about the insecurity of
PA, I would point out that our (nontechnical) interest in the
system produced by R-derivations (or similar Rosser systems) is
proportional to the strength of our belief that it is co-extensive
with PA. But the stronger this belief, tantamount to consistency of
PA, the less reason to bother with R-derivations.
The instrumentalist's perfectly coherent option here is to point
out a divergence of interests - that "our" interest is not hers.
Detlefsen's Hilbertian can live happily with a possibly pared down
ideal mathematics, even one of unmappable extent. The instru-
mentalist is under no obligation to lay claim to our "secret"
knowledge of the co-extensiveness of PA with the Rosser system.
The merits (and demerits) of this choice, however, lie beyond the
scope of this paper. 17
A final point about the double role of PA. Unless one takes
seriously the way In which the syntactic reading of PA yields a
notion of a formalism talking about formalisms that include it,
needless puzzles arise about the need for F-LPC. A useful way of
looking at this involves the related "puzzle" about proofs of the
G6del Second Incompleteness Theorem for systems weaker than
PA.
Typically, the first theorem is shown to hold for extensions of Q
(a finitely axiomatizable system) or perhaps for some other weak
system like PRA. The conditions on a system, needed for a proof
of the G6del First Incompleteness Theorem, are well known and
simple to state. The G6del Second Incompleteness Theorem,
however, is stated in full generality for extensions of a much
stronger system than Q, namely PA. Of course the technical
reason for this is that F-LPC will not be available in weaker
systems; but it is worth seeing why, conceptually, this is not a mere
ad hoc contrivance.
What underlies the presence of F-LPC is an ability to deal with
formalisms by being able to comprehend the essentially inductive
definition of a formalism. Before Ralph learned as much as he did,
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his syntactic beliefs were characterized, not by PA, but by Q.
Similarly with Edna. We maintain, for the moment, the same
readings of their beliefs.
What should Leopold make of the beliefs about P A or Q enter-
tained by the younger Ralph or Edna? They do not have any.
What should we make of Edna's possible belief represented by
CON Q? First of all she will not believe it. IX The delicate question,
however, is how we should read it or Ralph's deviant version
(which he can derive). In this case neither Edna nor Ralph know
what they are talking about; they do not know the first thing about
formalisms. Neither of them understand (have beliefs about the
defining characteristics of) formalisms in general or PA or Q in
particular. They cannot even entertain the propositions about PA's
or Q's consistency. To read these weak systems as making remarks
about formalisms would be to misconstrue what they are capable
of telling us.
NOTES
I would like to thank Harold Levin, Louise Antony, Joe Levine, and
members of the Triangle Language and Mind Group for helpful dis-
cussions and Michael Detlefsen for useful comments on an earlier version.
Detlefsen (1986) elaborates this in terms of human capabilities and
the possible divergence between humanly natural modes of reasoning
and correct modes of reasoning. This should be contrasted with the
treatment of these same matters by Hallett (1989).
2 Let T be a system of ideal mathematics and let S be a finitistieally
acceptable theory of real mathematics. There is some question as to
whether real-soundness should be taken as: [Real (A) & f-IAJ -
f-sA) or as the weaker [Real (A) & f-TA) - -, f- s -,A. On the
second fonnulation there can be real sentences not decided by S, and
if T proves them this does not obligate S to prove them. This is one
way for a Hilbertian to argue the irrelevance of the First Incomplete-
ness Theorem - the Gooel sentence, though real, is not finitistieally
established. Detlefsen (1990) points out that the weaker version of
soundness is the plausible one.
3 Auerbach (1985).
4 From this point forward I will use the convention of boldfacing to
indicate that a formal object is being referred to as well as, in the
appropriate contexts, to indicate that the formal object is the formal
representation of the nonbold informal term. Consider the simplest
case: 2 names the numeral for 2. We shall be concerned with
constraints on boldface mappings, particularly those that yield the
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useful 2 " the only even prime, although 2 - the only even prime.
Ultimately we want:
CON(PA) is not derivable; hence CON(PA) is not provable by
methods formalized by PA,
as a consequence of an adequate notion of boldfacing.
The word "derivation" will apply to certain formal objects, while
"proof' refers to those unformalized items discovered in the daily
practice of working mathematicians.
5 Let Pri' be
Pri(x, y) & -,3x x < Y & Prf(x, neg(y»,
which reads "x is a derivation of y and there is no smaller derivation of
the negation of y." For consistent formalisms like PA, Pri' is co-
extensive with Pri and numeralwise expresses what Pri does. A more
stripped down Rosser-style predicate is Pri":
Pri(x, y) & -,Pri(x, [0 = 1)).
The result of replacing Pri with either Pri' or Pri" in the
"consistency" formula is a trivial theorem. This dooms numeralwise
exprcssibility as a sufficient condition for capturing dicta. Sec
Auerbach (1985) for more details.
6 See note 11.
7 See Chapter IV of Detlefsen (1986).
8 Logic texts and the technical literature are often careless about the
intensional aspecJ of interpretation. Mates contains a brief discussion
of this. Boolos, in the chapter on Peano arithmetic in the forthcoming
second edition of Boolos (1978), is explicit: "s expresses the com-
mutativity of addition because it is, as we suppose, interpreted in
accordance with the usual interpretation N of PA, as we standardly
give that interpretation."
9 It need not be this way. One could directly formalize Syntax in its own
suitable language and prove the Gooel theorems directly for (and in)
it. As far as I know it is never done quite this way. However, some
approaches are certainly in this spirit; Smullyan's various abstract
versions of the Gooel theorems are based on stripped down formaliz-
ations of Syntax and the detailed framework for dealing with the
Godel results in a purely syntactical manner is supplied by his Theory
of Formal Systems. Computability Theory, Semantics, and Logic
Programming by Melvin Fitting is a recent modern treatment that
avoids the arithmetic route.
10 Examples help:
AtForm(x) is 3t < x 3t' < x «Term(t) /\ Term(t') /\ x
= (r=" t, t'» V x _ r .L ')
where r = ' and r .L ' are the numerals for the G6del numbers of those
symbols.
11 If F is a sentence of PA, how do you write in PA that F is a theorem?
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Well, F has a Godel number; call it f. Furthermore, there is a term in
PA that names f, in fact many. We define [F] as the numeral for f.
The standard way to write in PA that F is a theorem is Bew([F». It is
not in general true, if t is a term that denotlts f, that Bew([F» -
Bew(t) is a theorem. If we restrict ourselves to terms for provably
recursive functions then the biconditional is a theorem.
Now suppose that F is an open sentence of PA. As it stands, both
Bew(x < y) and Bew([x < y]) are syntactic nonsense; we would like
to give sense to such a formula so that we could say Bew(x < y) is true
of (2, 4). Well, what do we want this to mean? Presumably that a
certain sentence is a theorem. Not just any sentence with terms
denoting 2, 4 and a formula whose extension is is less than, but the
sentence 2 < 4. So we make Bew([F]) be true of some sequence of
numbers just in case the substitution of the standard numerals for
those numbers into F results in a theorem. Note that machinery like
this is necessary even to make sense of F-LPC and to define all the
appropriate varieties of term substitution.
12 Note the following feature of the boldface mapping. Let A be a
sentence of English in the vocabulary of the arithmetic interpretation
of T; and let the arithmetic formula it interprets be A. Suppose A is a
theorem of T. Now let S be a rewriting of A into the vocabulary of the
syntactic theory of T, constrained (only) by co-extensiveness, with the
presumed GOdel numbering as the basis. Facts: Any such S is true. S
need not be A. Indeed, S need not be a theorem. Moreover, if A were
a non-theorem, S might be a theorem.
13 My construction of Bew, based on faithfulness to the notion of
reading the formula syntactically, descends from the rigorous account
of Feferman (1960). This assures us, modulo a concern about the
representation of the axioms, of F-LPC.
In Feferman's generalization of the GOdel Second Incompleteness
Theorem, the boldface mapping (in Feferman dotting an expression
corresponds to our boldface) of complex syntactic notions is achieved
by straightforward transcription of their (often inductive) definitions.
In particular, the derivability predicate is a complex formula that
encodes a usual textbook definition of is a derivation of The basis of
such a definition is the set of axioms. This definition of is a derivation
of is the same across all formalisms, save for reference to the axioms.
(One assumes a fixed logical apparatus.)
How is reference to the axioms handled? Since there are, in the
case of PA, infinitely many axioms, they are formalized via an open
sentence. Many distinct open sentences will numeralwise express the
same set of axioms; this creates the same state of affairs sketched
above with respect to variant (and deviant) proof predicates. Only
certain of the open sentences that numeralwise express the axioms of
T really express the axioms of T. Feferman is able to characterize a
property, being an "RE-formula," that guarantees correctness. The
"RE" terminology comes from "recursively enumerable." In this case,
it roughly means that the formula has the form of an RE definition; it
does not mean (just) that the set picked out is recursively enumerable,
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but that it is picked out in a way that guarantees that the extension is
recursively enumerable. Feferman (1960) and Monk (1976) give the
details.
Those who have slogged through Godel's original paper, or some
other detailed proof, will remember that a great deal of trouble is
taken, not merely to define, in arithmetic, the right syntactic categories
but to define them in certain ways: in particular, with bounds on the
quantifiers. The purpose of this is to insure, not just that the sets
defined are numeralwise expressible, but that the very form of the
definition guarantees it. So a prover of the First Theorem shows that
the definitions pick out numeralwise expressible sets by adverting to
the form of the definitions. When the prover in question is PA itself,
as in the context of the Second Theorem, we need a formalization of
appropriate form. This, in effect, is what Feferman gives us with RE-
formulas. An RE-formula is one that canonically, as a matter of form,
picks out a recursively enumerable set.
This approach individuates formalisms by their "presentation" - and
co-extensive presentations are not intersubstitutable in the context of
the Second Theorem.
More precisely: if a(x) is a formula that numeralwise expresses the
axioms of T, a proof predicate can be const.ucted in a standard way
from a. Since many as numerically define the same set of axioms,
different formal proof predicates will be defined for the same axioms,
one for each a. Deviant as are bizarre ways of presenting the axioms -
bizarre enough to carry a trivial assurance of consistency.
14 "Partially," because I do not think enough has been said about the
initial steps ilf the assignment; in particular the role of numerals as
proper names has been left unexamined here. I leave that for another
paper, where I will take up a somewhat different defense of the
derivability conditions. There I will argue that Mostowski should not
have aimed at all truths and settled for some, but rather should have
aimed at analytiqruths and gotten them all. .
15 Many different notions of subsystem will do here. Ralph need under-
stand very little about the notion of subsystem; no more, in fact, than
the bare terminology suggests. For concreteness the following will do:
the nth subsystem is the formalism characterized by the axioms < n.
PA is not finitely axiomatizable, and so will have infinitely many
subsystems in this sense. Some more details are supplied below.
16 Cf. Visser (1989).
17 Detlefsen, in a private communication, has pointed out to me that
Detlefsen (1990) contains a discussion of this point. Detlefsen empha-
sizes the conceptual separability of "locative" concerns (what are the
theorems) and "quality-control" concerns (soundness). Given this
separability it is open to the Hilbertian to demand different sorts of
evidence in the two cases. Detlefsen makes the case that the Hilbertian
need not give a finitary answer to both concerns.
18 See Bezboruah and Shepherdson (1976).
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